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Abstract:  
Real estate markets remain localized and reflect differences by region. With a large number of 
brokerage firms and a smaller number of franchisors, a testable hypothesis is whether in 
equilibrium fees and royalties are equal to the additional return to the franchisee. If fees are set 
uniformly across the country, economic rents may be earned in specific local markets. Some 
franchisees may earn excess profits from the franchise arrangement. Empirical results for 1,143 
United States residential brokerage firms in 2001 show standardized uniform franchising costs 
cover any added returns to franchises in the Midwest and South. Excess returns are present for 
franchisees in the Northeast. The probability of being a franchisee increases with size and scale. 
Keywords Franchise . Residential brokerage . Self-selection . Profitability . Regional variation . 
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Introduction 
This paper models the decision by residential real estate brokerage firms to adopt a franchise. 
The industry is characterized by a large number of firms and relative freedom of entry and exit 
with respect to both doing business and choosing to be a franchise. At the same time, while any 
one franchisor sets fees that are uniform across the country, real estate markets retain local and 
regional characteristics. Across markets and regions, the franchisee will not accept the franchise 
if the fees and royalties exceed the additional return. But given the local nature of markets and 
barriers to entry, franchisees can receive added returns that cannot be captured by the franchisor 
without variable fees. 
 
The model tests for excess returns from obtaining a franchise, given the fee structure. One 
testable hypothesis is that the franchisor will set fees to remove any excess returns if the market 
is fully competitive. Another is that franchisees in some markets obtain excess returns if the 
franchisor cannot charge differentiating fees. Statistical controls are introduced to separate other 
influences such as the size and scale of the firm.
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 In franchising, the franchisor or parent firm offers inputs such as common marketing, technology, and training in 
exchange for an upfront fee and royalty payments (typically a percentage of revenue). There are over one million 
Realtors® according to the National Association of Realtors® (see http://www.realtors.org) and approximately one-
third are employed with franchised brokerage firms. The International Franchise Association 
(http://www.franchise.org) estimates that in 2000, franchisors and their franchisees had volume of $1 trillion, more 
than 40% of all US retail sales. These sales originated from over 300,000 franchised businesses in 75 industries. 
Franchising is estimated to employ more than eight million people. 
The franchisor offers a set of inputs not directly available to participating firms. These inputs 
include common marketing, affiliation programs, branding, training and technology such as 
databases and software. Franchisees specialize in inputs in their local and regional markets, such 
as labor and facilities and clientele networks. 
 
On the demand side, prospective franchisees evaluate net profits and returns from being in a 
franchise or remaining independent. On the supply side, the franchisor will accept the firm 
offering the highest expected profit or royalty revenue less its costs of provided inputs. The 
equilibrium sorts the type of firm by ability to generate profit and equates demand with supply. 
Initially all firms self-select whether or not they will enter into a franchise arrangement. 
Conditional on that decision, each firm experiences performance in earnings and net margin, 
separately for franchised and independent entities. 
 
The residential brokerage industry provides a test platform, since franchised and independent 
firms coexist. With uniform fees across markets and with some markets having more barriers to 
entry than others, the prospect emerges for some franchisees to obtain excess returns. The 
marginal franchisee in some markets without barriers other than the franchise fees would earn no 
economic rent. 
 
To test for sorting and these regional differences, residential brokerage firm data are used from a 
National Association of Realtors survey of 1,143 member firms in 2001, divided by region.
2
 The 
survey reports on net margins and net income, and therefore accounts for costs and expenses. In 
the sample, reported data for 313 firms that are franchisees and the remaining 830 that are non-
franchisees allows for sufficiently large sample sizes in each region. 
 
Empirical results indicate that franchisees have higher revenue than independents. Net margins 
or returns after expenses, however, are lower for franchised firms than for independents.  Net 
margins are higher at franchisees, but accounted for by franchise costs. These results confirm the 
underlying competitiveness of the residential brokerage industry. 
 
The local nature of some real estate markets, however, creates regional differences. Franchise 
fees are sufficient to remove any excess returns in the South and the Midwest. That is not the 
case in the Northeast, where franchising realizes excess returns. The results suggest that uniform 
fees for franchises and barriers to entry create excess returns in some real estate markets. 
―Franchising and Real Estate Firms‖ describes franchising in the real estate brokerage industry. 
―The Franchise Model‖ presents the model. Data and empirical results are in ―Data and 
Empirical Results.‖ Concluding remarks are in ―Implications and Conclusions.‖ 
 
Franchising and Real Estate Firms 
Local markets are distinguished by preferences, reflected in design and regulations with 
potential barriers to entry. Franchises are national, and focus on creating  uniform operational 
procedures and standardized marketing platforms to take advantage of economies of scale and 
scope. Franchises with their national uniformity appear to be the antithesis of local individuality. 
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 Another survey was carried out by the National Association of Realtors in 2004, but was more restrictive in data 
availability about net income and margin. 
In business design and architectural style, franchises have been slowly prevailing over local 
operators. Regional differences in formats and design have been disappearing in the operational 
and architectural features of franchised real estate.
3
 These businesses strive for uniformity in 
performance and product quality, even though regional differences may exist. Jakle and Sculle 
(1999, 65–67) and Kincheloe (2002, 125) note that fast-food firms in design and architectural 
standards tend to prefer conformity to national rather than local tastes. Jakle and Sculle (1994, 
17–18) indicate similar preferences for franchisees and independents vying with company- 
owned stores in the gas station business. 
 
Franchised firms offer name recognition, marketing strength, affiliations with relocation 
services, economies of scale in technology, and consistency of product. That consistency and 
uniformity imposes a cost when not accommodating regional differences in tastes and 
preferences. Several regional tendencies evidence these differences. Franchisors may insist on 
larger facilities, creating incentives for noncooperative behavior by franchisees. Regional 
considerations may dictate the size of local franchises. With a franchise, networks and contacts 
on the ground that generate business may be ignored. 
 
In residential real estate brokerage, the franchisor and franchisee have a common objective to 
increase the sale and listing of houses. Profits are created for both as they combine property, 
funds, and efforts to maximize joint sales. Existing research on franchising in real estate 
brokerage has concentrated on the uniform contract, even as there can be excess returns resulting 
from localized differences. Frew and Jud (1986) find that franchise affiliation has a positive 
effect on brokerage firm sales and house prices. Richins, Black, and Sirmans (1987) also support 
the idea that franchise affiliation increases revenues. 
 
Franchised structures can contribute to more competitive brokerage fees. The United States 
Government Accountability Office (2005) has examined the residential brokerage industry. The 
context was proposed legislation allowing financial firms such as banks to enter residential 
brokerage and property management. The intention was to examine various existing competitive 
and industrial organization structures of the industry. The GAO (2005, 14) notes that the 
franchised brokerage firm ReMax has faced resistance in some markets, while fostering 
competition. The reason is that ReMax charges its licensed brokers and agents a fixed monthly 
desk fee. In exchange, the licensees collect all the generated commissions. This payment 
structure is conducive to lowering overall fixed commission rates. 
 
Jud, Rogers, and Crellin (1994) in a national context estimate production technologies for 
franchised and independent real estate brokerage firms. Franchises sell more properties than 
independents, obtaining gross revenues that are 9% higher.
4
 Those revenues at the national level 
are sufficient to cover the royalties and franchise fees. The number of houses sold and revenue 
increases with both size and age. 
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 Kincheloe (2002) notes this observation for the fast-food industry and Jakle and Sculle (1994) in the gas station 
business. Franchised or centrally-operated businesses have imposed more uniform standards on members. 
4
 The estimates of Jud et al. (1994) are after subtracting royalties, fees, and other charges associated with franchise 
affiliation. The role of brokerage firms in helping to set listing prices in a competitive marketplace has been 
examined by Knight, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1994) and Sirmans and Turnbull (1997). 
In Lewis and Anderson (1999), franchised firms are more efficient at allocating resources. 
Franchised firms have lower costs per unit than their independent competitors. The degree to 
which a firm is not obtaining the maximum amount of output from a given level of inputs is its 
X-inefficiency. Using NAR data in the 1990s, Lewis and Anderson find that franchised firms are 
more X-efficient. Franchises add market share during growing markets, and hold their share 
during slower markets. During a seller's market, franchises are more able to attract listings 
because of their marketing networks. During a slow buyer's market with many listings, 
independents benefit. 
 
Regarding cost and technology, Anderson, Lewis, and Zumpano (2000) demonstrate that 
franchised firms are more efficient than independents, but franchises may not be more 
profitable.
5
 Lewis and Anderson (1999) show that franchised brokerage firms have lower costs 
than independents, but the average firm operates close to its efficient frontier. Franchised firms 
are more efficient in allocating resources, according to Anderson and Fok (1998), but 
independents have more scale and technical efficiency. 
 
Table 1 compares the costs of acquisition and entry for three of the most widely- held real estate 
brokerage franchises, Century 21, ERA, and Coldwell Banker, with those of popular restaurant 
franchises.
6
 The Subway restaurant franchise is one with 
 
relatively low acquisition and entry costs, but their entry costs are still higher than those for the 
three real estate brokerage franchises. 
 
The Franchise Model 
Franchisor-provided inputs involve economies of scale, such as common advertising to a mass or 
national market, purchasing, training, capital access, affinity programs, maintaining databases 
and technology. In exchange for the set of franchisor inputs, the franchisee pays a royalty as a 
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 Zumpano, Elder, and Anderson (2000) note that greater firm costs may have led to increased consolidation among 
brokerage firms to take advantage of economies of scale. Consolidation has encouraged even more franchising as 
franchising allows brokerage firms to substitute variable costs for fixed costs so as to reduce break-even output 
levels. 
6
 An additional franchise is ReMax, which has costs and fees that are less homogeneous. ReMax operates with sales 
associates paying fixed costs for a desk fee and a chargeback on overhead and office expenses. In exchange, sales 
associates receive a larger percentage of the upside, essentially viewing the cost charged by ReMax as a call option 
on their earnings. 
percentage of gross revenue. Most franchising arrangements also require an up-front payment as 
an initial franchise fee. The incentives for boosting output motivate the franchise relationship 
(Martin, 1988), while competition for space and cannibalization within the geographic trade area 
drives down franchisee returns (Mazzeo, 2002).
7
 
 
One test is whether additional returns from franchising are eliminated in an environment where 
fees are uniform across markets. Since the franchisor offers economies of scale through 
standardization, the franchise and royalty fees are uniform. Another test is whether the returns 
from franchising across markets are homogeneous. 
 
The model is based on the stylized conditions in the real estate brokerage industry. The industry 
has a large number of firms, all of which are eligible to join a franchise. Those holding a 
franchise coexist with those not adopting. The number of franchisors by comparison with the 
potential number of franchisees is relatively small. Brokerage firms self-select into franchises 
based on observable variables. If there are fully competitive conditions among brokerage firms, 
the franchisor sets fees that eliminate any excess returns. However, if the franchisor is 
constrained to set uniform fees across the country in all markets, it is possible for some 
franchisees to obtain excess returns. 
 
For a franchise model of the real estate brokerage firm, production occurs with directly 
purchased inputs x such as the payments to sales associates, office space, and utilities. The 
technology includes shift variables a such as size and age, all permitted to vary across markets. 
The real estate firm has a choice between selecting a franchise or not. A franchisor offers inputs 
z including referral networks, national marketing, affiliate services, training and technology such 
as database services. For holding a franchise, the franchisee pays a fixed franchise fee and a 
variable royalty as a percentage of total revenue at rate s.
8
 Franchises are available at a price to 
all firms in the industry, but there is no prohibition against operating without one. If the 
brokerage firm decides to acquire a franchise, an indicator variable is 1=1; otherwise the decision 
is 1=0. 
 
The brokerage firm's revenue without a franchise is r(x, a) depending on the sales associate 
inputs and other purchased services x and the fixed shift variables a. The cost of directly 
purchased sales associate commission splits, support labor, and office overhead is c(x, a), 
increasing and convex. If the firm obtains a franchise, the revenue is (1—s) r (x, z, a), where s is 
the royalty payment. The franchisor provides marketing and other support z in exchange for the 
royalty. The franchisee's profit is revenue less cost or (1—s) r (x, z, a) —c (x, a). The net margin 
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 Franchising contracts are methods of sharing and reallocating risk, as discussed in Gallini and Lutz (1992) and 
Lafontaine (1992). There have been other justifications for franchising. Prendergast (2002) views a franchise as a 
method for delegation when there is uncertainty in output. When there is more uncertainty, compensation is based 
on output. The franchise has been viewed as a mechanism similar to sharecropping, although there are enforcement 
issues should one party fail to comply (Lafontaine & Raynaud, 2002). 
8
 The franchisor may charge up-front fees and/or upfront fees. Sometimes franchise fees are a tradeoff for the 
royalty. In a model where there are both fees and royalties, the franchisee's benefit is added revenue. At maximum 
profit there is a negative tradeoff between the royalty and the franchise fee. Using the notation of Eq. 1, if the 
franchise fee is k, differentiating totally at maximum profit 
 
y for a franchisee is the profit per dollar of net revenue, or .The firm's net 
profit margin from becoming a member of a franchise network is 
 
 
The franchisee hires its sales associates and makes other direct purchases x. The franchisor-
provided inputs z as well as its size and scale a help the franchisee to generate revenue and 
profits. When the decision is not to have a franchise, the firm's net profit margin is 
 
Here the residential brokerage firm sets the level of franchise-provided inputs z at zero, in 
exchange for retaining all the gross commission revenue. No royalty fee s is paid. 
 
The firm chooses to hold a franchise when the profit exceeds that from being independent, or 
 
 
The conditions 1, 2, and 3 obtain in different markets, but the franchisor sets common fee 
structures. So the up-front fixed fee k and the percentage royalty s are constant across markets. If 
the franchisor sets the royalty s too high such that the second inequality in Eq. 3 is reversed and 
firms are informed, none will adopt the franchise. On the other hand, if uniformity of agreement 
leads the franchisor to set the same royalty s around the country, Eq. 3 can hold as a strong 
inequality. The franchisor will effectively be under-pricing in some markets. 
 
The ratio of expenses to revenue for a franchise including all fees must be less than the expense 
ratio for a non-franchised firm. Regardless of size and given the franchise terms, the firm selects 
to be a franchise when the net profit is positive. The condition 3 establishes the demand for a 
franchise. It may be optimal for the firm not to hold a franchise, in which case the weak 
inequality in Eq. 3 is reversed. A firm of a given size, location, or scale a will choose a franchise 
when it provides an enhancement, leading to 
 
 
The above condition applies to the demand side for franchises. There is a corresponding supply 
side from the franchisors. Franchisors, including firms across the quality spectrum of the market 
from Century 21 to Coldwell Banker to Sotheby's, provide national marketing, training, affinity 
relationships, technology, and branding.
9
 The franchisor offers inputs z in exchange for royalty s. 
A given franchisor operates within the set of firms ranked by structure a=1,...,A that provides the 
highest profit return. The franchisor supplies the same inputs to all firms, and its cost function is 
c(z). The profit condition is 
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 These franchisor inputs are developed to increase the market appeal for franchised brokerages which may reduce 
uncertainty for customers unfamiliar with the local market. 
 
 
If franchisor-provided inputs z and its size and scale a help the franchisee to generate increased 
revenue, then the franchisor promotes that brokerage firm which offers the most benefits from 
franchising.
10
 
 
The result is a two-stage self-selective process within each market or region. In the first stage, 
conditional on fixed attributes such as size and location a, firms select or reject the franchise 
contract. In the second stage, conditional on the first stage self-selection, firms achieve their 
success through the profit margin. 
 
Let I* be an index of intensity for choosing a franchise. This index is based on the condition 
y(x(s, z, a), z, a, I = 1) — y(x, 0, a, I = 0). Letting W be a list of the variables that determine 
intensity, the franchise selection decision is 
 
 
The indicator variable is I=1 if the firm chooses a franchise and zero otherwise. Here the 
variables W have parameter a. The disturbance is v with zero mean. Contingent on that choice, 
the firm has a performance variable y such as net margin, net income or gross revenue. 
Comparing firms with and not holding franchises 
 
 
 
The expected values of the performance disturbances, contingent on the franchise choices are 
 
This correction is obtained by estimating the performance equations, corrected for self-selection 
as:
11
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 The selection process could include requirements related to capitalization, professional qualifications of 
personnel, etc. as well as market-driven criteria such as the number franchises offered in a particular geographic 
area. 
11
 The self-selection procedure is as in Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999). 
 
 
According to Eq. 9, the decision about whether or not to accept a franchise within a given market 
is associated with opposite-signed self-selection coefficients. With all other conditions equal and 
competitive entry and exit, franchised firms have higher revenue and income. The independents 
have a choice of whether to franchise. If they decline, they save the franchise fees, so the net 
margins are higher for independents if the market is competitive. The franchisor is constrained 
by setting its fees uniformly across markets. Those fees eliminate any excess returns at least in 
some markets, but the absence of variability can lead to the persistence of excess returns in 
others. 
 
Adjusted for the conditional probability of holding a franchise, and after paying all required fees, 
the franchisee earns a positive excess return. This situation can occur if the residential brokerage 
business is imperfectly competitive, with barriers to entry and exit. These are all testable 
hypotheses for the self-selection coefficients as shown in Eq. 11, so 
 
 
 
For the net margin 
 
The empirical objective is to test for the benefits of a franchise. Those benefits vary not only by 
the size and structure of the firm, but also regionally. With some parts of a country growing 
faster than others, less-informed new residents looking for a house are attracted to a franchise by 
the assurance of uniform quality signaled by the franchised brand. 
 
Data and Empirical Results 
The data are from a survey conducted by the National Association of Realtors in March 2001 of 
residential brokerage firms in the United States on financial performance. The NAR survey 
contains information on revenue, income and net margin by firms organized by size, age, the use 
of technology, and whether or not there is a franchise. The net margin is gross revenue less 
expenses, so costs are implicitly included. 
 
A key classification is by region. Firms with all characteristics are distinguished by the four 
Census regions of the Northeast, Midwest, South and West. Those four Census regions are 
typically used by the NAR for reporting transactions and sales. The Northeast includes New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania. States in the Midwest in Region 2 are Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and North and South Dakota. 
 
The South includes Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. The West in Region 4 includes Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and 
Washington. Separate data sets on the variables and the resulting probit are constructed for each 
of the four regions, to test for homogeneity. 
 
If more than 50% of a respondent's business is from commercial brokerage, the firm is removed 
in order to obtain a sample of firms that focus primarily on residential real estate. The result is 
1,143 eligible firms. The empirical models for testing the franchise theory include probit and 
sample selection regressions.
12
 The probit and self-selection are for each region separately. 
 
In the probit model, the dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm is a franchisee and 
zero if it is independent. The explanatory variables for the probit model are age of the firm as a 
measure of reputation (Age), having an affinity elationship (Aff), a relocation service (Reloc), 
the number of other services (Oser), medium-sized firm dummy variable (Mfirm), large-sized 
firm (Lfirm), and the 
 
number of third-party websites where listings are posted (Numwebs).
13
 The firms are grouped by 
size for the number of licensed brokers and agents employed. Small firms have 0-10, medium-
sized firms 11-200 and large firms more than 200 licensees. 
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 Although it would be desirable to include a larger number of variables in both stages of the analysis, the NAR 
survey of brokerage firms reports a limited number of useful variables. In addition, many variables are substantially 
collinear. 
13
 The other services offered by residential real estate brokerage firms include business brokerage, escrow service, 
home improvements, home inspections, home warranty, home insurance, other insurance, mortgage lending, moving 
services, securities brokerage, settlement services, termite inspection, title insurance and title search. 
 
In the second stage of the empirical analysis, a sample selection regression is estimated using the 
probabilities from the probit model. The dependent variable represents three profitability 
measures: the natural log of revenue, the natural log of net income, or net margin expressed as 
percentage points. The independent variables are Reloc, Age, Mfirm, Lfirm and a dummy 
variable for being a one office firm (Oneoff). 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the 2001 sample; 26.51% or 313 of the firms are 
members of a franchise. The remaining 830 are not franchised. The mean revenue for the 
franchise firm sample is $22.08 million or about 1.94 times the amount of the mean revenue for 
the independent sample. The mean net income for the franchise sample is $2.46 million or 1.77 
times the net income of the independent sample. The firm's profit is expressed as its net margin, 
which is the 
 
difference between revenues and expenses. The franchise net margin is lower, at 73% of the net 
margin for independent firms. 
 
These initial sample means indicate higher revenue and net income, but lower net margin at 
franchised firms. However, self-selection and other factors such as firm size could also explain 
the differentials. A larger proportion of franchise firms are either medium or large firms. 
Therefore, a more in-depth analysis is needed to isolate the effects of the franchise fee and 
royalty. 
 
The first stage of the sample selection analysis is the estimation of the probit equation.
14
 
Estimates are for the non-reference Regions 1-3 in the Northeast, Midwest and South and for the 
United States. If the coefficients in each region are identical, then there is homogeneity. The 
franchise fees are sufficient to capture all excess returns. The West had to be excluded because 
of the small sample size of franchised firms. 
 
Table 3 shows the probit findings by region and nationally. Among the regional models, the 
South probit has the best fit. Unlike regression models, probit model coefficients cannot be 
directly interpreted unless they are converted by taking partial derivatives. These partial 
derivatives, or marginal effects, are reported in the bottom of the table. 
 
 
 
The findings of the marginal effects in Table 3 indicate that affinity, number of other services 
provided, firm size, and number of third party website (Numwebs) listings are positively related 
to the probability of being a franchised firm. Only Numwebs is consistently and statistically 
significant in the national and regional probit models. When evaluated at the mean and within the 
sample range for Numwebs, the probability of being a franchise increases nationally by 4.48%. 
The probability increases in a range from 3.79 to 7.70% depending on the region. Firms that 
offer other services are more likely to be franchises. Each service offered increases the 
probability by 2.08% in the national sample. Firm size increases the probability of being a 
franchise. Nationally, the probability increases by 13.41% for large firms only. In the South, the 
probability is 10.46% greater for medium size firms and 21.68% greater for large firms when 
evaluated at the means for the combined sample.
15
 
 
Although separate probit models are shown by region, a likelihood ratio test reveals that the 
individual regional models are not statistically different from the model using the combined 
sample of firms from the Midwest, Northeast and South at the 5% level of significance. The 
likelihood ratio test is calculated as LR = 2* (LU — LR), where LU is the unrestricted logarithmic 
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 The probit model estimates are corrected for heteroscedasticity. All probit model and sample selection regressions 
were estimated using Limdep 8.0. 
15
 When dummy variables are included in the probit model, a better approximation to determining the marginal 
effect is to compute the marginal effects at 0, 1 for each dummy variable. This method, however, can lead to large 
number of estimated coefficients. Therefore, only the partial derivatives at the means are shown. 
likelihood. This is the sum of the logarithmic likelihood ratios for the three regions. The 
restricted logarithmic likelihood is LR. 
 
The test results for regional aggregation are in Table 4. The results indicate that the returns for 
the residential brokerage sample selection model differ across each region. These results indicate 
the possibility that unless royalty and franchise rates differ by market, not all excess returns are 
captured. There are underlying firm characteristics that are associated with a firm selecting a 
franchise. These include large size and the extent of scale and technology, reflected by the 
number of services 
 
and websites supported. Thus, at least in the first stage, a correction is required for specific 
factors affecting the franchise selection decision. 
 
The second stage tests whether the fitted conditional probability of selection affects financial 
performance. In this stage, the estimation of the sample selection regressions uses weighted least 
squares to correct for sample heteroscedasticity. The weights used in this procedure are the 
sample weights from the survey, and they are designed to reflect the differential probability of 
firm and item non-response.
16
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  Historically, the National Association of Realtors surveys of real estate brokerages had suffered from a biased 
response where smaller brokerages responded at a rate significantly higher than that of larger brokerages. To correct 
for this in their 2001 survey, NAR stratified the brokerage industry’s firms into four different groups. NAR then 
―over sampled‖ firms with 11–200 agents and those with more than 200 agents relative to firms with just one agent 
 
The findings of the sample selection regression for total revenue are shown in Table 5. Although 
both the national and regional regressions for the franchise and independent samples are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, the franchise 
 
regressions are more robust in all cases. The sample sizes for the franchise samples, however, are 
substantially smaller, thus magnifying the difficulty in achieving statistical significance for many 
coefficients. 
 
In the national samples for franchises and independents, firm size appears to have the greatest 
and most widespread impact on franchise revenue. Although medium and large firms by head 
count have larger revenues, this relationship is more pronounced for franchise firms. Age 
contributes to total revenue. Each year of age increases revenues by 1.32% for the independent 
firms and 2.60% for franchises. For franchise firms in the South, the average increase per year is 
1.85% higher than nationally. For the independent sample, the relocation service coefficient may 
be capturing some size effects. These services may be offered by larger independent firms.
17
 
                                                                                                                                                             
and those with two–ten agents. These ―larger‖ firms received the survey twice to induce a greater response. A 
weight was developed to control for both the over sampling of firms with 11 or more agents and for the different 
response rate for each of the four stratified groups. 
17
 Another anomaly is the coefficient for one office for independent firms in the Northeast region which would be 
expected to have a negative coefficient. However, regional samples have much smaller sample sizes, and moreover, 
given the multitude of estimated coefficients, some coefficients might show statistical significance due to random 
chance. 
 
The self-selection coefficient in the revenue regressions are shown in Table 5. For independent 
firms, the findings indicate positive coefficients for the self-selection that are statistically 
significant. But in Eq. 9, the self-selection conditional probability has a sign reversal from the 
estimated coefficient. Even after controlling 
 
for size, scale, region, reputation and self-selection, independent firms have lower revenue than 
franchises. The findings of the franchise samples by region are mixed. The South coefficient is 
statistically significant and positive while the Midwest and Northeast sample selection 
coefficients have the opposite sign. The national franchise sample has a statistically insignificant 
self-selection coefficient. The self- selection indicates that independents have lower revenue in 
the US and all regions except the Northeast where the coefficient is insignificant, allowing for 
the sign reversal in Eq. 9. 
 
Estimates for the dependent variable in Eq. 10 as y for net income are in Table 6 adjusted for 
self-selection. Similar to the findings of the revenue regressions, net income is most affected by 
head count as measured by medium and large firm size variables. Although the Oneoff 
coefficient is not statistically significant nationally, it is negative and statistically significant in 
the South for the franchise sample. For the independent sample, the Oneoff coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant in the Northeast. For franchises as a whole, each additional year of 
age increases net income by 1.44%. In the South the increase is 3.86%. These findings indicate 
that regional effects differ across the country. 
 
The relocation coefficient is positive and highly significant for the national sample of 
independent firms, but not statistically significant for individual regions.
18
 The findings of the 
regional regressions indicate that franchise firms with one office in the South and Midwest have 
lower net income, which is statistically significant at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively. 
Independent firms with only a single office and located in the Northeast have larger net income. 
 
Independent firms have lower net income for both the United States and the South, based on the 
coefficient of the self-selection term, using the sign reversal of Eq. 9. In the Midwest and 
Northeast, the self-selection term is not significant. In none of the regions or in the US does the 
self-selection variable for franchise firms have a coefficient that is significantly different from 
zero. As a result, at least in the South and the country, there is lower net income for 
independents. The finding of lower net income for independent brokerage firms appears to be 
consistent with the contention by Lewis and Anderson (1999) that franchise firms have lower 
costs. 
 
The final set of tests is to compare margins after all expenses, including for franchise fees. Those 
are reported in Table 6. The net margin is gross revenues less all expenses including franchise 
and royalty fees, divided by gross revenues. This dependent variable is expressed in percentage 
or basis points. 
 
Firm size appears to be less important in explaining the net margin than that for the revenue or 
net income models. Medium size firms have a lower profit margin than either small or large 
firms. From a regional perspective, medium-sized franchised firms have lower net margins in the 
Midwest and South. For independents, medium-sized firms have lower returns in the Northeast. 
One-office firms have a higher net margin for independents in the national sample, but a lower 
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 The large coefficient appears abnormally large, which could be explained by the relocation variable capturing 
other characteristics which leads to larger revenues. Note that 98% of both the franchise and independent samples 
are comprised of firms with relocation services. The remaining 2% of firms may be considerably smaller, and in 
areas with little migration from external markets. 
margin for franchises. Single-office firms may have difficulty generating sufficient revenues to 
pay the franchise fees and royalties. For the national samples, the negative coefficient for the age 
coefficient indicates that each additional year of age reduces the net margin by 0.46% for 
franchises and 0.23% for independents.
19
 This trend is not shared by independent firms in the 
Northeast, as the net margin increases by 0.36% for each additional year of age. 
 
The results of Table 7 suggest that at least in the US and the Midwest, independents have higher 
net margins. The self-selection coefficient is negative, subject to the sign-change of Eq. 9. In the 
South, independents have higher net margins at a 10% confidence level, but not at the 5% level. 
There is no significant difference in the Northeast. 
 
In the upper panel of Table 7 are the results for the self-selection among franchisees. Self-
selection increases the net margin in the United States, but with a magnitude lower than that for 
independents. Taking the differential, independents retain a higher net margin. For the Midwest 
and South, self-selection has no impact on franchisees. Since the Midwest has higher margins for 
independents, in this region this group can be said to have higher net performance. The result is 
similar in the South. Independents have higher net margins, though this conclusion is drawn only 
at 10% confidence levels. 
 
The only difference is in the Northeast where franchised firms have higher net margins than 
independents. The self-selection coefficient is positive and significant for franchisees, raising net 
margin, while not significant for independents. These results may indicate potential market 
power for the franchisees, where a return is made over and above the franchisee fee and royalty 
payments. Otherwise, the Midwest, South and the United States indicate higher gross revenues 
but lower net margins for franchisees, revealing that fees and royalties lead to full capturing of 
returns by franchisors. 
 
Implications and Conclusions 
This 2001 NAR data set allows the direct testing of hypotheses about franchising in terms of firm 
profitability and size along with regional effects. First, the data allow for self-selection testing as 
to whether or not a residential brokerage firm adopts a franchise. Second, the sample allows for 
testing about whether the existing fee and royalty structure provides for effective sorting between 
franchise and non-franchise brokerage firms. 
 
The findings indicate that franchisees usually are larger firms that offer a greater number of 
services. Independents generate less revenue than franchises, even when controlling for other 
extraneous influences. This result supports the contention that the franchisors are offering useful 
additional inputs to the revenue generating process including national marketing, training, 
affinity relationships, technology, and branding. Similarly, from a national perspective, 
independents appear to have lower net income relative to franchises, holding constant other 
influences. 
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 This might be explained by examining the national regressions for revenue and net income. While each has a 
positive relationship, the revenue coefficient is substantially larger than the net income coefficient. Taken together, 
it would be expected that the net income would decline with age. 
The performance and returns to franchised firms differ across the country. Franchise fees cover 
excess returns for the United States, Midwest and South. That is not the case in the Northeast, 
where there may be imperfectly competitive conditions that lead franchisees to obtain an excess 
return. 
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